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Whether campaign advertising influences election outcomes is an open question; a paradox 
given the amount spent on campaigning in general and TV advertising in particular. We argue that 
such “absence of documentation” is due to the focus of the empirical literature on the United States, 
in which the allocation of campaign spending and advertising is decentralized. We explore a quasi-
natural experiment that enables us to mitigate the omitted variables and reverse causality problems 
caused by decentralized allocation. In Brazil, gubernatorial elections work in a two-round system. In 
the first round, candidates’ TV time shares are determined by their coalitions’ share of seats in the 
National Parliament. In the second round, TV time is split equally between the first-round winner 
and runner-up. Using differences between rounds as a source of variation, we find a large causal 
effect of TV advertising on election outcomes. 
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Scholars, advertisers and policy makers have long held an interest in how political campaigns 
affect voting behavior. However, measuring campaign effects has been an elusive task. Goldstein 
and Ridout (2004) summarize the literature and conclude that “...determining whether political 
campaigns influence individual vote choice and election outcomes has become a Holy Grail”. The 
existing empirical research that uses field data suffers from identification issues, and often finds an 
intriguing “minimal effects” result. Examples of studies that recover a small impact of money and 
advertising abound: on campaign spending, see Levitt (1994) and Gerber (1998);
2 on advertising, see 
Finkel (1993), Gelman and King (1993) and Shaw (1999). In contrast, theoretical work on elections 
and lobbying takes it for granted that money and advertising matter (see, e.g., Snyder, 1989; Baron, 
1994; Grossman and Helpman, 1996). If money and advertising are irrelevant, how can we 
rationalize the large sums spent on political campaigns in general, and on TV advertising in 
particular? 
Difficulties in the existing empirical literature are due to limitations in dealing with 
identification issues caused by reverse causality and omitted variables. Most research consists of 
regressing election outcomes on a measure of either campaign spending or voters’ exposure to 
advertising. Reverse causality occurs because donors expect their money to buy political influence, 
and thus contribute more generously to candidates with a high probability of winning. Unobserved 
heterogeneity in candidates’ quality causes omitted variable bias. Another source of trouble is 
unobserved electoral district preferences. For example, a right-wing candidate running in a leftist 
district has difficulties in both raising money and getting votes. Most theoretical mechanisms 
indicate that correlation-based methods, such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), produce upwardly 
biased estimates (an exception occurs when a candidate is strong enough to make money 
unnecessary). Econometric difficulties are particularly acute with U.S. data because funding, 
spending and campaign advertising are all choices of the candidates and donors.  
The literature recognizes the difficulties, but is only partially successful in solving them. 
Many studies adopt the strategy of using proxies to mitigate the omitted variables problems (Green 
                                                 
2 The empirical literature focuses on US races. Because the most important item on campaign spending in the U.S. is TV 
advertising, the distinction between spending and TV advertising is immaterial (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1996). In 
fact, political scientists normally use spending as a proxy for advertising (Goldstein and Ridout, 2004). 3 
 
and Krasno, 1988). However, it is unlikely that proxies will fully capture complex concepts such as 
the overall quality of a candidate or the preferences of an electorate. Some authors instrument for 
campaign spending or electoral advertising (Welch, 1981; Gerber, 1998; Rekkas, 2007). However, 
finding convincing instruments is difficult. Consider Gerber (1998) and Rekkas (2007). Both use 
lagged campaign spending at the district level as an instrument for current candidates’ spending. The 
idea is that candidates tend to spend more in districts where previous election campaigns were 
costly. Yet, insofar as candidates run for the same position in multiple years, lagged campaign 
spending is correlated with current election outcomes, invalidating its use as an instrument. 
Part of the literature resorts to experiments. Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1996), Valentino, 
Hutchings and Williams (2004) and Brader (2005) all provide laboratory evidence that TV 
advertising influences voters’ behavior. Our results are in line with laboratory evidence in both 
direction and magnitude, although it is hard to compare magnitudes of lab experiments with real 
votes. Laboratory studies offer unparalleled internal validity, but have weak external validity. For 
this reason, we view our results as complements to the laboratory evidence.  
From a methodological perspective, our work is closely related to papers that exploit natural 
experiments. Gerber et al. (2007) run a field experiment during the 2006 Texas gubernatorial race. 
They randomize the date and volume of TV and radio advertisements for one of the candidates, and 
evaluate how they affect voters’ perception. They find a positive but transient advertising effect. In 
terms of magnitude, their estimates are smaller than ours. Some concerns remain, however. 
Randomization is a powerful tool, but Gerber et al. only randomize the advertisements for one of the 
candidates. More importantly, the experiment took place in January 2006, several months before the 
election. Voters’ attention at this stage is not comparable to right before the election.
3 Given these 
differences, it is not surprising that Gerber et al. find a much smaller impact of advertising on voters’ 
intention than we do. 
Huber and Arceneaux (2007) use data on the 2000 U.S. Presidential campaign, and explore 
variation in advertisement within non battleground states to evaluate its impact over voters’ 
perception and voting outcomes. They compare media markets bordering a contested state (high 
advertising) with “isolated” markets (low advertising). However, residents of areas close to a 
                                                 
3 Indeed, about half of the respondents of the survey used by Gerber et al. declared to be unfamiliar with one of the 
candidates, and close to one third of the respondents declined to express a vote preference. In addition, the content of the 
ads used in the experiment was not typical of an election. For example, as Gerber et al. describe, the ads neither mention 
the candidate’s opponents nor make any request for vote support. 4 
 
contested state share many characteristics with their fellows across the border. Thus, the same 
elements that determine the TV advertising strategy in a competitive state also determine voting 
across the border, which may invalidate the identification strategy.  
Levitt (1994) also uses field data to identify the effect of campaign spending on election 
results. He compares the same pairs of contestants in multiple U.S. congressional races. Using only 
differences in voting and spending between races, Levitt eliminates all unobserved heterogeneity 
that is constant over multi-year periods – thus mitigating problems associated with omitted variables 
and reverse causality. However, an important question arises: after first-differencing the data, what 
source of variation is left to estimate the impact of spending on election outcomes? If the 
identification strategy is successful, then candidates’ fundraising should be roughly constant over the 
time – except for small random variations. Starting from an equilibrium situation, small variations in 
campaign spending would have a small impact on electoral performance. Not surprisingly, this is 
precisely what Levitt finds. A related point is made by Prat (2002, 2006), who presents a model in 
which campaign spending serves as a signal of candidates’ quality. However, in order to obtain 
funds from contributors, candidates have to distort their platforms away from the median voter’s 
ideal point. In equilibrium, the benefit of spending in terms of votes is offset by the policy bias 
needed to raise contributions. Thus, the net observed effect of campaign spending over election 
outcomes should be low. 
We explore a quasi-natural experiment provided by the Brazilian electoral legislation. 
Gubernatorial elections work in a two-round system. A runoff happens if no candidate reaches 50% 
of the votes in the first round. In this case, the two top voted candidates advance to the second round. 
For a period of time before each round, TV and radio networks must air candidates’ advertising free 
of charge, and no additional paid TV or radio advertising is allowed. First-round TV time is 
distributed among candidates according to their coalitions’ representation at the National Parliament. 
In the second round, candidates split TV time equally. We explore the difference in TV time 
between rounds to estimate the impact of advertising on election outcomes. We consider only the 
pairs of candidates that make it to the second round, and take first-differences to control for time-
invariant unobserved candidate and district heterogeneity. 
Our strategy resembles Levitt’s (1994) in the sense that we compare the same pair of 
contestants in different races – two rounds of the same election in our case. There are two major 
differences, however. Levitt’s races are at least two years apart. In contrast, the runoff is no more 5 
 
than 28 days after the first round, increasing the confidence that most candidates’ and districts’ 
characteristics are constant over races. More importantly, TV time is determined by law, and the rule 
produces large changes in the distribution of TV time between rounds. In summary, we observe the 
same pair of candidates with different TV time shares in two races close to each other in time. In 
addition, the variation in TV time between rounds is largely outside the candidates’ control. Unlike 
Gerber et al. (2007), we have TV advertising for both candidates during the entire campaign. We 
find a large impact of TV advertising on election outcomes. Using our preferred estimate, a one 
percentage point (p.p.) increase in a candidate’s TV time share causes a 0.272 p.p. increase in her 
vote share. Using only first-round data, which is admittedly endogenous, we recover a stronger 
impact of advertising on election outcomes. This is precisely what theory predicts: OLS 
overestimates the impact of advertising. 
We then investigate the determinants of advertising effects. The literature is almost silent 
about the circumstances under which media has an impact on electoral outcomes.
4 We can address 
this issue because of the large variation in demographics across cities in our sample. We find 
stronger media effects in poorly educated cities where TV penetration is high. We also find 
somewhat weaker evidence that advertising has a stronger impact in poorer and more unequal cities. 
These results are important for two reasons. The theoretical literature on lobbying normally assumes 
that candidates use contributions to advertise to uninformed voters (Baron, 1994; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1996). Our results provide support for this assumption. In addition, the fact that media 
effects vary with education and TV penetration sheds light on the underlying mechanism, and 
provides additional support for causal interpretation (Deaton, 2009). 
  Our experiment is not flawless. Other unobservable factors may change between rounds. 
While the first round is a multi-party race, only two candidates run in the second round. This 
structural difference raises a number of concerns regarding how strategic actors change their 
behavior between rounds. For example, defeated first-round candidates may forge informal alliances 
with runoff contestants, and candidates may change their fundraising or spending strategies between 
rounds. If such changes are systematically related with the rearrangement of TV advertising time 
between rounds, they may cause bias in our estimates.  
We discuss several non-TV factors that threaten the identification of advertising effects. An 
extensive robustness analysis suggests that non-TV effects are not driving our findings. Naturally, 
                                                 
4 Huber and Arceneaux (2007) is an exception. 6 
 
we are unable to exhaust the list of potential threats, but we cannot think of any reasonable 
alternative story that rationalizes the results. Serious identification problems have been plaguing the 
empirical literature on campaign effects for a long time, and our experiment is an improvement 
within the field data literature.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents facts about political institutions in 
Brazil, with emphasis on gubernatorial elections and campaign advertising. In Section 3, we describe 
the data. Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy. Results are in Section 5, which also contains an 
extensive robustness analysis, as well as direct evidence on non-TV factors such as fundraising, 
spending and negative advertising. Section 6 discusses external validity, and includes results from 
mayoral races. Section 7 concludes.    
 
2 ELECTORAL ADVERTISING IN BRAZIL 
 
  Brazil is a federal republic with 26 states and a federal district (the capital, Brasília). Both in 
the states and in Brasília, the executive branch is headed by a governor, who is elected by direct 
ballot in a two-round majority system every four years. Candidates must be supported by a party or a 
coalition of parties. The number of political parties is close to 30, but only a few are relevant at the 
national level. Voting is mandatory for all citizens between 18 and 64 years, and voluntary for 
citizens aged 16 and 17, and older than 65.
5 Consequently, turnouts are uniformly high across 
elections and across rounds. Averaging over the three election years in our sample (1998, 2002 and 
2006), first and second round turnouts were 81.35% and 80.69%, respectively. 
All candidates participate in the first round. If none reaches 50% of the votes, a runoff 
between the two first-placed candidates takes place some 28 days after the first round, and the 
candidate with the most votes wins. Table 1 shows the dates of first and second rounds of the three 
gubernatorial election years in our sample. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
Federal law mandates that part of the TV and radio daily grids must be allocated free of 
charge to campaign advertising for a period of 45 days preceding the first round of the elections. It is 
forbidden to buy additional airtime. Campaign advertising for gubernatorial races is aired on 
                                                 
5 Failing to vote carries significant penalties. Besides fines, sanctions include ineligibility for public employment, for 
passport issuance, and for participation in government transfer programs. 7 
 
Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, in two blocks of 25 minutes each, one at lunchtime and another 
at the evening prime time. Additionally, short ads of up to one minute are distributed along the grid, 
adding up to 30 minutes daily. In case of a runoff, advertising (again mandatory) starts 48 hours after 
the first-round results are officially announced, and ends on the Friday before the elections.
6 Second-
round advertising is aired daily, in two blocks of 20 minutes each, at lunchtime and at the evening 
prime time. In the first round, gubernatorial elections compete for airtime with both presidential and 
legislative races. In the second round, it shares time only with the presidential race.
7 Gubernatorial 
races have 1,145 minutes of first-round airtime. The second-round airtime varies. The average in our 
sample is 920 minutes.  
First-round TV time is allocated according to the following rule: 1) one third is equally 
divided among candidates; 2) the remaining is distributed proportionally to the share of seats that 
coalitions have in the lower house of the National Parliament at the beginning of the legislature.
8 If a 
runoff is necessary, advertising time is split equally between the two remaining contenders.
9 
 
3 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
We draw on three sources of data. Election data are from the federal electoral authority, the 
Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE). We have: 1) the voting records of candidates for three 
gubernatorial elections (1998, 2002 and 2006) and three mayoral elections (1996, 2000 and 2004); 2) 
party coalitions supporting candidates; 3) the distribution of seats by coalition in the National 
Parliament at the beginning of the legislature; 4) a measure of negative advertising; and 5) funding 
and expenditure data by date for the 2008 mayoral elections. Items 2) and 3) allow us to compute the 
allocation of TV time according to the rule described above. Demographics are from the 2000 
census. Finally, poll data are from IBOPE, the main polling institute in Brazil. 
                                                 
6 Brazil has electronic ballot, and vote counting is very fast. Official results are normally announced within 24 hours 
after the polls are closed. 
7 Presidential races follow the same rules as the gubernatorial ones. A runoff was necessary in 2002 and 2006. 
8 Party switching occurs in Brazil. Allocation of campaign advertising time is determined by coalitions’ share at the first 
day of the current legislature. We do not have this data. Instead, we observe the voting outcomes for the previous 
legislative elections, and use this to approximate the composition of the National Parliament at the beginning of the 
legislature. Elections and swear-in ceremonies are three months apart. Thus, our measure of advertising time has some 
noise but the amount of party switching is limited within this three-month period. 
9 The allocation of radio advertising time follows the same rules. Thus, the impacts of TV and radio are 
indistinguishable. 8 
 
The main sample is composed of all gubernatorial races between 1998 and 2006 in which a 
runoff was necessary.
10 In total, we have 34 races in 18 different states. Table 2 has information 
about the sample, which covers all five regions in Brazil. States range from European-like Southern 
states such as Rio Grande do Sul to underdeveloped Northeastern states like Ceará. The three most 
populous states are included (São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro). 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
Table 3 shows the distribution of the National Parliament by party for the 1994, 1998 and 
2002 legislatures, which determine the allocation of TV time in the gubernatorial elections of 1998, 
2002 and 2006, respectively. Some facts about the Brazilian political system emerge. More than 20 
parties have representatives in the National Congress. Four are dominant: center-right Partido da 
Frente Liberal (PFL), centrist Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), center-left 
Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), and leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). The 
effective number of parties is roughly seven.
11  
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
Table 4 presents correlations between the distribution of seats by party at the National 
Congress and at the state legislatures. Out of 34 correlation coefficients, 23 are over 0.70. Thus, TV 
time allocation in gubernatorial races correlates with political strength at the state level, preventing 
the identification of the impact of TV using first-round data only.  
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
The average number of first-round candidates ranges from 6.23 in 1998 to 7.90 in 2006 
(Table 5). The average number of effective candidates is 3.7. Thus, the first and second rounds are 
structurally different races, although not as much as the raw number of candidates suggests. 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
Table 6 contains mean vote shares and advertising times of the first-round winner and the 
runner-up. Not surprisingly, winners have more advertising time on average. Inspection of columns 
(2) and (3) shows a closing gap: the mean difference in vote shares between the winner and runner-
up shrinks between rounds. The difference in TV time also shrinks (it is zero in the runoff), 
suggesting a positive relation between the two variables. 
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
                                                 
10 Except for Brasilia, the federal district, which is in practice a city, and it is included in the mayoral races we present 
later in the paper. 
11 The effective number of parties is the inverse of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of vote concentration. 9 
 
4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
The data has a panel structure. The cross-sectional unit is an election e, defined by the pair 
year (t) – city (i). The time-series unit is a round r. We observe cross-sectional units twice, once for 
each round, e.g., the first round in city i of the 1998 gubernatorial election is one observation (r = 1). 
The second round is another (r = 2).
12 
Our races are for governor, but the unit of analysis is a city. Using cities increases the number 
of observations and leverages the precision of our estimates, even after clustering observations at the 
state level. More importantly, it allows us to investigate how the impact of TV varies with 
demographics. We treat cities of different sizes equally because we are not interested in parameters 
representative of Brazilian states. Furthermore, when we decompose the impact of TV according to 
demographics it is more natural to treat observations equally. For robustness, we also implement a 
procedure that weighs cities according to their population as a percentage of the state population. 
This produces results that are representative at the state level. 
Let  A and B be the first-round winner and runner-up, respectively. Let  er A votes_  and 
er B votes_  be the share of votes in the round r of election e of the first-round winner and runner-up, 
respectively. For example,  2 _ e A votes  is the second-round vote share of the first-round winner of 
election e. Analogously,  er A TVtime_  and  er B TVtime_  are the shares of advertising time in round r 
of election e of the first-round winner and runner-up, respectively. We define:  
 
er er er B votes A votes votes dif _ _ _ − =  and  er er er B TVtime A TVtime TVtime dif _ _ _ − =  
 
We normalize first-round votes to sum 1, making them comparable to second-round figures 
(by construction, runoff shares sum to one). Notice that  0 _ 2 = e TVtempo dif   for all e 
because 5 . 0 _ _ 2 2 = = e e B TVtime A TVtime for all e. We estimate the following linear specification: 
 
                     er e r er er X round TVtime dif votes dif ε λ ω γ α + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = _ _                                 (1) 
 
                                                 
12 Cities do not necessarily appear three times in the sample. A few cities were created over the 1998-2006 period. More 
importantly, not all state races required a runoff in all three election years. 10 
 
γ is the parameter of interest. We test the hypothesis that γ  > 0.  
  roundr is a dummy that takes the value of one for r = 2. If ω < 0, then the average voting gap 
closes between rounds. Controlling for this “round-specific effect” is crucial. Table 6 shows that the 
average gap in TV time (dif_TVtimeer) shrinks between rounds. Regardless of television, dif_voteser 
may also shrink if runner-ups are unknown and voters pay closer attention in the second round. In 
the absence of roundr, the coefficient γ captures this average “shrinking effect”. In summary, our 
procedure uses only how dif_TVtimeer changes (between rounds) differently in different races.
13 
Xe is a vector of time-invariant characteristics of race e, and includes city characteristics, 
election-year specific effects, and, more importantly, candidates’ characteristics; because the runoff 
is held three weeks after the first-round, most determinants of electoral performance are in fact 
constant; εer contains all time varying unobserved determinants of the electoral outcomes. 
Ex ante differences in candidates’ strength affect election performance. First-round coalitions 
- which determine TV time allocation – are formed taking into account the expected chances of 
winning.
14 Thus, candidates’ strength not only belongs to the right-hand side of (1), but also 
correlates with the first-round TV time allocation (dif_TVtimee1). However, when we first-difference 
the data, ex ante candidate strength drops out from (1), along with all the other time-invariant factors 
in Xe. The estimated equation is: 
 
                           ) ( ) ( ) _ ( ) _ ( er r e e round TVtime dif votes dif ε ω γ Δ + Δ ⋅ + Δ ⋅ = Δ                          (2) 
 
Δ is a “difference-in-differences” transformation, i.e. the difference over rounds of the difference 
between the first-round winner and runner-up.
15 
In an ideally controlled experiment, we would observe the same pair of candidates twice (or 
multiple times) within a short period of time, and under identical election settings except for the TV 
time share. Our experiment violates the last condition. The first and second rounds are different 
races, and electoral conditions change between rounds. Scandals may emerge, although this is not a 
serious threat to identification because TV time is allocated a priori.  If defeated candidates tend to 
                                                 
13 The runoff dummy is analogous to period dummies in an ordinary panel. It controls for all “period-specific” effects 
and prevents the coefficient of interest from capturing spurious time effects. 
14 Members of the coalition normally share the spoils of victory in the form of positions in the elected administration. 
15 Because stronger candidates usually have more first-round TV time, dif_TVtimee1 tends to be large when the ex 
ante difference in candidates’ strength is large. Since dif_TVtimee2 = 0, Δdif_TVtimee correlates with the unobserved 
differences in strength. But candidates’ characteristics drop out after first-differencing and thus pose no threat. 11 
 
support weaker runner-ups, then TV time will capture unobserved second-round support, biasing 
results away from zero. Voters may pay a closer attention to runner-ups once they make it to the 
second round. Fundraising, and consequently spending, ability may change between rounds. All 
these “non-TV effects” pose threats to our identification strategy.  For the moment, we notice that 
the winner and runner-up receive together around 80% of the first-round votes (see Table 6). Thus 
the first round resembles a runoff.  
Nevertheless, we implement a procedure that accounts for non-TV effects, at least partially. 
The second-round TV campaign starts a few days after the first-round ballot. The first second-round 
polls are typically conducted one week after the first-round. We use the following modified 
dependent variable: 
 
() ( ) 2 2 2 2
* _ _ _ _ ) _ ( e e e e e B Poll A Poll B votes A votes votes dif − − − = Δ                      (3) 
 
Poll_Ae2 and Poll_Be2 are the statewide vote intentions in the first second-round opinion poll. All 
non-TV effects taking place within a week of the first-round are “priced-in” the first poll, and are 
thus captured by the modified dependent variable. One example is support from defeated candidates, 
which is normally announced within a day or two after the first round.  
  Unfortunately, poll data is not available at the city level. However, because the poll is 
representative at the state level, it is equivalent to a weighted average with frequency weights equal 
to the city population as a percentage of the state population. Thus, it is natural to weight 
observations according the city population when using the modified dependent variable.
16  
  Section 5.2 discusses “non-TV effects” in depth and presents evidence that, although possible 
theoretically, competing effects are not relevant empirically in our sample. 
     
5 RESULTS 
  
5.1 Main Results 
 
Table 7 shows the main results. Column (1) has the estimates of equation (4) using the whole 
sample. The point estimate means that a one percentage point change (p.p.) in the difference in TV 
                                                 
16 We emphasize that the reason for weighting is not making results representative at the state level.  12 
 
time share causes a 0.272 p.p. change in the difference in vote share. The estimated coefficient is 
significant at the 1% level. The effect is also significant in practice. Averaging out the three elections 
in the sample, the mean first-round TV time share difference is 7.7 p.p. (see Table 6). Thus, the 
mean impact of advertising on the vote difference (second-round difference is always zero) is 
7.7×0.272 ≈ 2.10. The mean gap between the first-round winner and runner-up shrinks by 3 p.p. 
between rounds. Thus, changes in TV advertising are responsible for closing 70% of the gap. 
          [TABLE 7 HERE] 
To account for the fact that the first and second rounds are structurally different races, we 
focus on sub-samples of races whose first and second rounds look alike. In column (2), the sample is 
composed of races in which the third-placed candidate is not pivotal for the second-round race, i.e., 
her votes are not enough to turn the race around in favor of the runner-up in the second round. 
Results are stronger. In column (3), the sub-sample is composed of races in which the two first-
placed candidates have more than 92.04% of the votes in the first round (75
th percentile). Results are 
stronger. In column (4), we focus on races in which the runoff was likely (winner had less than 45% 
of votes, the median). In this case, voters should have been paying attention to both the winner and 
the runner-up, and the first round would look more similar to a runoff. Results are again stronger. 
In column (5), we weight observations by the city population as a percentage of state 
population, which produces an estimate representative at the state level. The impact of TV is now 
smaller, 0.179, but still significant statistically. TV advertising now represents 7.7×0.179 ≈ 1.38 or 
46% of the closing gap. Thus, the effect is still significant in practice. It is not surprising that the 
impact of TV is smaller when we give more weight to larger cities. As we show below, the impact of 
TV is stronger in less educated places, and larger cities are better educated. This is one of the reasons 
why we prefer non-weighted estimates. In column (6), we use the modified dependent variable 
(
* _ e TVtime dif Δ ). The (statistically significant) impact of TV advertising is now 0.168, only slightly 
lower than 0.179 [column (5)], the comparable weighted figure with the original dependent variable.  
Finally, we include the difference in the first poll of the first round to control for the ex ante 
differences in vote intention. Regardless of the dependent variable used [the original, the weighted 
original, or the weighted modified, columns (7) through (9)], results are similar to the uncontrolled 




5.2 Non-TV Effects 
  
We now discuss non-TV effects, a major challenge to the causal interpretation of results. 
 
5.2.A First and Second-Round Fundraising and Campaign Expenditures 
 
Campaign expenditures and fundraising are major stumbling blocks to identification. 
Brazilian races are expensive, especially if one considers that TV airtime is free of charge (Samuels, 
2001).
17 Candidates may withhold first-round expenditures to have larger sums to spend in the 
runoff. For example, if a runoff is clearly necessary and the runner-up spot is not contested, the 
winner and the runner-up may withhold first-round expenditures. A surprise runner-up may see a 
surge in fundraising revenue. All these possibilities pose challenges. We cannot control directly for 
expenditures and fundraising in our regression models, but we have data on them by date and 
candidate for the 2008 mayoral elections. Although these are not gubernatorial races, mayoral races 
follow similar electoral rules and have similar party structure. Table 8 shows first-round spending 
and fundraising as a proportion of total spending and fundraising (first plus second round) for 
several sub-samples. We have 28 races in which a runoff was necessary. 
 [TABLE 8 HERE] 
Row (1) shows several facts. First, fundraising and spending occur mostly in the first round, 
which is expected because the first-round race is longer than the runoff. Expenditures are more 
concentrated in the first round than fundraising, suggesting that money raised in the second round is 
partially used to settle first-round debt. Thus, instead of withholding expenditures, candidates do the 
opposite. Winner and runner-up raise and spend similar amounts in the first round as a proportion of 
total expenses and receipts. Relatively higher runner-up spending in the second round would raise 
the suspicion that differences in TV time capture an increased ability to raise and spend money. 
Weak runner-ups may improve their fundraising prospects when they advance to the second 
round. To test the hypothesis, we focus on elections in which the runner-up was relatively weak, i.e. 
races in which the first-round vote difference between the winner and runner-up is above the median 
[row (2)]. Weak runner-ups rise slightly more in the first round than in the whole sample (70.8% 
                                                 
17 In the 1994 presidential elections, Cardoso (the winning candidate) spent US$ 41 million. For a comparison, in the 
1996 American race, Clinton spent roughly US$43 million, and Dole some US$ 45 million. Brazilian gubernatorial races 
are similarly expensive. 14 
 
versus 67.8%). Consequently, they spend slightly more in the first round (61.2% versus 60.3%). 
When runner-ups are weak, winners raise and spend less money in the first round [column (2)].  
Strategizing expenditures between rounds is more valuable when a runoff is likely. In row 
(3), we focus on races in which the winner's vote share is below the median (41.34% in this sample). 
Both the winner and the runner-up spend less in the first round when a runoff seems likely, but the 
difference is small: 1.1 and 2.0 p.p. for the winner and runner-up, respectively. Thus, strategizing 
spending between rounds is unlikely to correlate with Δdif_TVtimee. 
The runner-up may have to overspend in the first round when the race for the second place is 
contested. If weak runner-ups are more contested by the third-placed candidates, then changes in 
spending between rounds may correlate with changes in TV time (but the bias is against finding an 
effect of advertising). Runner-ups do spend more when the first round race is contested, but the 
difference is small [row (4)]. 
 
5.2.B Further Robustness Checks 
 
Table 9 contains additional robustness checks. Except otherwise noted, the benchmarks for 
comparison are those that include the first first-round poll as a control: for even-numbered columns 
in Table 9, the benchmark is 0.356 (column (7) in Table 7); and for odd-numbered columns it is 
0.181 (column (9) in Table 7).
18  
[TABLE 9 HERE] 
First-round winners may have better first-round campaigns and win most of the votes they 
aspire to win, leaving little improvement ahead for them. In contrast, runner-ups may have more 
fledgling campaigns and thus have more improvement to make for reasons other than an increase in 
TV time. We call this the “diminishing returns” hypothesis. Decreasing returns pose a threat because 
the runner-ups have less TV time in the first round (see Table 6). We restrict the sample to races in 
which the runner-ups have more TV time than the winner [column (1) and (2)]. When the original 
dependent variable is used, the estimated impact is a little smaller [0.293 in Table 9, column (1) 
versus 0.356 in Table 7, column (7)], but still significant statistically and in practice. When we use 
the modified dependent variable, results are stronger than the benchmark [0.342 in Table 9, column 
                                                 
18 We report the original (non-weighted) dependent variable, which yields our main estimates of interest, and the 
modified (and weighted) dependent variable, our main robustness check. Results using the original weighted dependent 
variable are similar and available upon request.  15 
 
(1) versus 0.152 in Table 7, column (9)]. Diminishing returns also pose a threat if the runner-up is 
much weaker than the winner. In columns (3) and (4) we focus on a sub-sample of strong runner-ups 
(more than 34% of votes, the median). Results are similar. 
Regardless of TV advertising, voters and the media may take a “second look” at surprising 
runner-ups (surprises typically concern the runner-up, not the winner). The Electoral Law (Lei 9,504 
from 1997) mandates that TV coverage is fair and balanced. Jurisprudence interprets this as: 1) equal 
coverage time of candidates’ campaign activity in the news; and 2) all candidates must be invited to 
all debates with equal speaking time. Thus, coverage is uniform, and no TV coverage closing gap 
arises. Nevertheless, we address this concern with the following sub-sample exercise. If a “second-
look effect” drives results, then the impact of TV should be smaller when voters know who the 
runner-up would be. Columns (5) and (6) focus on cases in which race for runner-up spot is not 
contested (difference between the runner-up and the third-placed is large). Results are similar. 
Rounds differ in the total amount of TV time available for the winner and runner-up. In our 
sample, they have a total of 655 and 920 minutes in the first and second rounds, respectively.
19 To 
increase comparability between rounds, we select a sub-sample in which the winner and the runner-
up have more than 50% of the first-round TV time. In this case, the average TV time they have is the 
same across rounds. Results in columns (7) and (8) are again similar to the benchmark figures.     
Finally, members of relatively smaller parties that manage to advance to the second round 
will probably receive most of their parties’ resources during the runoff. This may create bias because 
weaker runner-ups may attract more resources and make larger gains for reasons other than the 
larger jump in TV time. We exclude cases in which the runner-up’s coalition participates in less than 
three runoff races in the whole country [columns (9) and (10)]. Results are similar. 
 
5.2.C Negative Campaigning 
 
In a multi-party runoff system, many candidates compete for the second place. Thus, part of 
the TV time in the first round may be aimed at knocking down contestants for the runner-up spot. 
This strategy suggests that the runner-up’s real change in TV time between rounds is greater than the 
                                                 
19 Gubernatorial races had 1145 minutes of first-round airtime in all three election years. Second round time varies: 1050, 
825 and 1210 in 1998, 2002 and 2006. Since more races in our sample come from 1998 and 2002, the average TV 
second-round TV time in our sample is 920 minutes. The runner-up and the winner have 57% of the first round airtime. 16 
 
change measured by TV advertising. In this case, we may overestimate the impact of TV: the runner-
up does better once the attacks stop. 
We believe that “negativeness” does not drive results for two reasons. First, we have a direct 
measure of “negativeness” in campaigning for some races. In Brazil, an electoral judge arbitrates 
litigation among candidates. The most common demand is for Direito de Resposta, i.e. the right to 
use the offender candidate’s TV time to reply to “offensive” propaganda. The number of requests of 
Direito de Resposta is a proxy for the “negativeness” of first-round campaigns. Requests were 
compiled by the TSE for some states.
20 Among contested runner-up races (difference between the 
second and the third placed less than the median [11%]) for which we have data (11 races), the mean 
number of requests is 10.36. Among landslides, requests are slightly higher, 13.60. The sample size 
is quite small (23), but the data suggest that “negativeness” does not correlate with the 
competitiveness of the first-round race. 
Second, some robustness checks also address the issue of “negativeness”. For example, we 
expect more attacks when the runner-up spot is hotly contested. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 9 we 
focus on strong runner-ups. In column (5) and (6), we restrict the sample to races in which the 
runner-up is much stronger than the third-placed candidate. In both cases, the impact of TV is similar 
to the comparable ones in Table 7 [columns (7) and (9)].  
 
V.3 First-round Results 
 
Estimates using only first-round data are biased away from zero because stronger candidates 
have more first-round TV time. If our strategy works, the estimated impact of TV using only first-
round data should be higher than in Table 7. We report first-round estimates in Table 10.
21 The 
impact of TV is 0.510 [column (1)], i.e., much higher than the benchmark estimate in Table 7, 
column (1) (0.272). Inclusion of the difference in vote intention in the first first-round poll reduces 
the impact of TV advertising to 0.406, as expected [column (2)]. Nevertheless, results are still higher 
                                                 
20 The algorithm for collecting data is as follows. In the TSE database for judicial decisions (jurisprudência at 
http://www.tse.gov.br/internet/jurisprudencia/inteiro_teor_blank.htm), we search, by electoral regional court (TRE) and 
by gubernatorial race in our sample, for the expression Direito de Resposta in judgment decisions (acordãos). We use 
the number of hits as the measure of requests for Direito de Resposta. If the search came empty, we checked whether the 
search for any judicial electoral decisions is empty. If not, then we impute the number zero as the number of requests of 
Direito de Resposta. Otherwise the race is missing because data for that court-race pair have not been compiled. 
21 We cannot control for city and election year fixed-effects when using first-round data. The best emulation is a set of 
election year and city dummies. 17 
 
than the comparable one in Table 7 [0.356 in column (7)]. Not surprisingly, ex ante stronger 
candidates perform better: the estimated coefficient on the difference in vote intention is positive 
(0.064) and statistically significant. The difference in the estimated impact of TV is partly due to 
different samples (polls were not conducted in all races). We re-estimate the model maintaining the 
sample constant and the results remain similar [column (3)].
22 
[TABLE 10 HERE] 
 
V.4 Demographic Determinants of TV Advertising Effect 
 
Documenting the mechanism through which TV advertising affects electoral outcomes is 
interesting per se. It also serves as a falsification test. We expect media effects to be stronger in less 
educated where TV penetration is high. The model is: 
 
er e r er
er e e er
X round TVtime dif
TVtime dif Shifter Shifter votes dif
ε λ ω
γ η α
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + +
× ⋅ + + =
_
_ _
                                 (4)
 
 
We take differences and estimate the following equation: 





TVtime dif Shifter votes dif
ε ω
γ
Δ + Δ ⋅ + Δ +
Δ × ⋅ = Δ
_
_ _
                                                 (5) 
 
Using the 2000 census, we match election-year data with city-level information. We consider 
six shifters: population, income per capita and its distribution, number of years of schooling, and TV 
and radio penetration. Table 11 has descriptive statistics. Table 12 contains the results. In columns 
(1) through (5), we include the interaction of each shifter with ΔdifTVtimeer, one at a time. The 
impact does not vary according to city size [column (1)].
23 TV advertising has a stronger impact in 
poorer [column (2)], more unequal [column (3)], and less educated [column (4)] cities. Seemingly 
surprising, TV and radio penetration are associated with a smaller impact of advertising [columns (5) 
and (6)]. However, TV and radio penetration capture income.       
                                                 
22 We discuss the estimates in columns (4) and (5) in Table 10 when we analyze the external validity of the results. 
23 This result is not in contraction with the difference between weighted and un-weighted estimates in Table 7, where the 
weight is city population as a percentage of state population, not the size of cities. 18 
 
      [TABLE  11  HERE] 
      [TABLE  12  HERE] 
In column (6), we include interactions simultaneously. Now TV penetration has the expected 
sign: advertising has a stronger impact where TV penetration is deeper.
24 Education survives intact 
the inclusion of several factors. The coefficients on inequality and income maintain their sign, but 
are no longer statistically significant. In summary, advertising has a stronger impact where predicted. 
The literature on lobbying commonly assumes that candidates take lobby money and use it to 
advertise to uninformed voters (Baron, 1994; Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Snyder, 1989). Our 
results support this assumption empirically. Advertising not only influences voters’ choice, but its 
impact is stronger where voters are poorly educated, i.e. “uninformed”. 
 
6 DISCUSSION: EXTERNAL VALIDITY 
 
The internal validity of our results is partially due to the specific nature of our empirical 
setting. In this section we discuss external validity. Before proceeding, a short digression on 
Brazilian gubernatorial elections in international perspective is warranted. 
Brazil is a multiparty presidential federal republic. Elections for president, governor and 
mayor are held under a majority rule. Several countries share many of the characteristics of the 
Brazilian political and electoral system. Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Russia, the 
United States, and Venezuela have federal systems with majority voting for all levels of 
government.
25 Except for the United States, all have multiparty political structures. A non-exhaustive 
list of countries with majority systems for president includes: Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, 
Croatia, Ecuador, France, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Indonesia, Serbia 
and Zimbabwe. Several of these countries have multiparty systems or are federal republics. Many 
entities share other electoral characteristics with Brazil. For example, similar to their Brazilian 
counterparts, American states are wide geographical areas with large populations. Under these 
conditions, TV is an important political advertising tool. Many local races throughout the world are 
held under a multiparty majority system, either in one round or two rounds. Arguably, TV is more 
important in gubernatorial and national elections. Nevertheless, as we show below, TV advertising is 
                                                 
24 Radio penetration does not have enough variation across cities to estimate anything precisely (see Table 11). 
25 Although Colombia and Peru are not de jure federations, they are de facto federations because Governadores de 
Departamento are elected by direct ballot. 19 
 
also important for local elections in Brazil, which increases the overall external validity of the 
results. In summary, Brazilian electoral institutions are not a peculiarity.  
 
6.1 Comparison with Races Decided in the First Round 
 
By construction, our design focuses on the races in which a runoff was necessary. Thus, it is 
a sample of sufficiently contested races. In terms of external validity, an important issue is whether 
races decided in the first round are systematically different from the sample races in dimensions 
other than contestability. For example, if runoffs occur in richer places, it is harder to extrapolate the 
results. We assess this possibility by estimating the following model: 
 
                                    () ( ) st st X f X FirstRound = = | 1 Pr                                        (5)    
 
s is a state and t is an election year (1998, 2002 and 2006). FirstRoundst = 1 if the race st was 
decided in the first round, and 0 otherwise. Xst is a vector of state race characteristics, which includes 
the following demographics and electoral variables: 1) demographics (income per capita, growth of 
income per capita in the election year, income inequality, and education measured as the average 
number of years of schooling); 2) year and region dummies; 3) electoral variables (electorate size, 
number of candidates, and the lagged FirstRoundst). We present estimates for a linear probability 
model and Probit marginal effects. 
      [TABLE  13  HERE] 
Estimates in Table 13 show that races decided in the first and second rounds are similar with 
respect to socio-economic demographics and political variables. Covariates are neither individually 
nor collectively significant in any of the four estimated specifications.  
We also estimate the impact of advertising in races decided in the first round. External 
validity would be weakened if results were different than the first-round results among races in our 
main sample (i.e., races decided in the runoff). Table 10 contains the results. Comparing columns (4) 





6.2 Mayoral Elections 
 
We introduce results from mayoral elections for two reasons. First, it is an opportunity to 
probe the robustness of results in another setting. Second, it serves as an additional test of external 
validity. Mayoral elections take place every four years and follow rules similar to gubernatorial 
races. Cities with more than 200,000 voters follow the same two-round system (remaining cities 
have one-round races). Voting is mandatory. The allocation of TV time is also similar.
26 The sample 
is composed of the 107 races that required a second round in the 1996, 2000 and 2004 election 
years.
27 Table 14 presents mean vote and TV time share for the mayoral races.
28 
     [TABLE  14  HERE] 
In contrast to gubernatorial races, the winner and runner-up have roughly the same TV time 
in the first round (compare with figures in Table 6). Correspondingly, no average closing gap arises. 
In addition, the winner and runner-up in mayoral races both have less TV time share than in 
gubernatorial races. Interestingly, they also have less first-round votes. 
     [TABLE  15  HERE] 
Table 15 shows the results of a model similar to (2).
29 TV has a smaller impact than in 
gubernatorial races: the (statistically significant) coefficient in column (1) is 0.176 (versus 0.272, the 
most comparable estimate in Table 7). This is expected because Brazilian states are large and 
disperse geographically. Thus, far-reaching media such as TV should have a stronger impact on 
gubernatorial than on local races, where direct contact with the voter is more common and practical. 
Nevertheless, sample cities are large, and we still expect TV to influence election outcomes. 
The remainder of Table 15 contains robustness checks. Column (2) has the pivotal exercise. 
Column (3) shows a subsample of races in which the first round is similar to the second round (sum 
of vote shares of the winner and runner-up is more than 69%, the median). In column (4), the sample 
is restricted to cases in which the runner-up has more TV time than the winner. All results are 
similar. Estimated standard errors are robust to clustering [columns (6) through (8)]. 
 
                                                 
26 In 2000 and 2004 the rule was exactly the same. In 1996 it was slightly different: candidates shared only a fifth 
equally, instead of a third. 
27 This includes the 1998 and 2002 races in Brasilia, the federal district. 
28 Polls were conducted in very few cities, preventing us from using the modified dependent variable. 
29 In contrast to gubernatorial elections, the source of variation in TV time is the same as the unit of observation (the 
city). Thus, there is no need to weight according to population to recover “representative” parameters. Nevertheless, 




The “minimal effects” conventional wisdom is at odds with the perception of politicians, 
political analysts and general practitioners. Using quasi-experimental data, we find evidence that TV 
exposure in gubernatorial elections in Brazil has a strong effect on election outcomes, both 
practically and statistically. The magnitude – between 46% and 70% of the closing gap from first to 
second rounds in gubernatorial elections – shows that TV advertising is a major determinant of 
election outcomes. As expected, advertising has a stronger impact where voters are uneducated and 
have access to TV. Finally, advertising also matters in mayoral elections, corroborating the results 
from the gubernatorial races. 
Brazil is the fourth largest democracy in the world, so results are relevant in practice. 
Gubernatorial elections involve reaching voters in large, geographically diverse states, which is not 
so different from gubernatorial or senate races in the United States. Furthermore, many other 
countries have state or provincial elections with similar characteristics. The use of large-scale TV 
advertising is a widespread phenomenon in modern democracies.  
Our results have clear policy implications. A common concern in democracies is the 
influence of economic power on election outcomes. We show that money indeed can buy elections 
because TV advertising matters. But precisely because TV advertising matters, a centralized 
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Table 1 - Gubernatorial elections in Brazil, 1998-2002
Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) and Lei N° 9.504, September 1997.
 
 
State 1998 2002 2006 Number of Municipalities
Amapá X X 16
Ceará X 184
Goiás X X 242
Maranhão X 217
Mato Grosso do Sul X X 77
Minas Gerais X 853
P a r á XXX 1 4 3
Paraíba X X 223
Paraná X X 399
Pernambuco X 185
Rio de Janeiro X X 91†
Rio Grande do Norte X X 167
Rio Grande do Sul X X X 467††
Rondônia X X 53†††
Roraima X X 15
Santa Catarina X X 293
São Paulo X X 645
Sergipe X X 75
Table 2 - Sample
†In 2006, the state of Rio de Janeiro had 92 municipalities
††In 2006, the state of Rio Grande do Sul had 466 municipalities
†††In 2002, the state of Rondônia had 52 municipalities










Party 1994 1998 2002
PPR 51 0 0
PDT 34 25 21
PT 50 59 91
PTB 32 31 26
PMDB 107 83 76
PSC 3 2 1
PL 13 12 26
PPS 2 3 15
PFL 89 105 84
PMN 4 2 1
PRN 1 0 0
PP 34 0 0
PSB 15 18 22
PSD 3 3 4
PV 1 1 5
PRP 1 0 0
PSDB 63 99 70
PC do B 10 7 12
PPB 0 60 48
PRONA 0 1 6
PSL 0 1 1
PST 0 1 3
PSDC 0 0 1
Total 513 513 513
Herfindhal-Hirschman Index 1227 1403 1179
C 4 60% 68% 63%
C 2 38% 40% 34%
Table 3 - Elected members of the Federal Chamber of Deputies, by party 
Year




Amapá 0.61 Amapá 0.48 Goiás 0.77
Goiás 0.83 Ceará 0.68 Maranhão 0.57
Mato Grosso do Sul 0.82 Mato Grosso do Sul 0.75 Pará 0.72
Minas Gerais 0.80 Pará 0.87 Paraíba 0.82
Pará 0.87 Paraíba 0.70 Paraná 0.93
Rio de Janeiro 0.61 Paraná 0.87 Pernambuco 0.88
Rio Grande do Sul 0.60 Rio Grande do Norte 0.73 Rio de Janeiro 0.70
Rondônia 0.46 Rio Grande do Sul 0.62 Rio Grande do Norte 0.65
Roraima 0.28 Rondônia 0.80 Rio Grande do Sul 0.74
São Paulo 0.85 Roraima 0.55 Santa Catarina 0.89
Sergipe 0.89 Santa Catarina 0.86
São Paulo 0.91
Sergipe 0.83




Table 4 - Pairwise Correlation: Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and in the State Assemblies†
1994 1998 2002
 
Mean Mean ± 1 Std. Dev
1998 6.23 (3.64, 8.82)
2002 7.86 (4.90,10.81)
2006 7.9 (5.82,9.98)
Table 5 - Number of first-round candidates
Year
Number of Candidates







Mean time share in the 
first round of the 
elections†
Mean vote share 
in the first round 
of the elections†
Mean vote share in the 
second round of the 
elections†
1st round winner 31% 43% 52%
1st round runner-up 27% 37% 48%
1st round winner 29% 41% 53%
1st round runner-up 23% 33% 47%
1st round winner 34% 44% 51%
1st round runner-up 21% 37% 49%
Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE)
‡: Statewide votes







†† (4)Ұ (5)£ (6)£‡ (7) (8)£ (9)£‡
0.272 0.311 0.301 0.307 0.179 0.168 0.356 0.181 0.152
(0.077)*** (0.070)*** (0.051)*** (0.110)*** (0.055)*** (0.051)*** (0.066)*** (0.055)***(0.055)***
-0.260 -0.138 0.094
(0.046)*** (0.060)** (0.046)*
-0.002 0.003 0.051 -0.008 -0.035 -0.008 0.018 -0.029 -0.057
(0.029) (0.025) (0.019)** (0.034) (0.019) (0.020) (0.081) (0.023) (0.053)
Number of Observations 7923 4537 1981 5463 7835 6991 7749 7663 6976
F-statistic 12.52 20.01 27.68 7.74 10.5 10.61 23.06 6.42 5.97
R
2
0.129 0.184 0.184 0.146 0.069 0.226 0.323 0.137 0.221
Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) and IBOPE.
*** = significant at the 1% level
** = significant at the 5% level
* = significant at the 10% level
§ Standard errors are clustered at the state-election year level. First round vote shares are normalized to sum 1.
†† Sample restricted to elections in which the sum of the winner and the runner-up votes were more than 92.04% of the votos in the first round (75th 
percentile of the sum of votes of winner and runner-up).
‡ Modified Dependent Variable: Difference from 1st second-round opinion poll
Ұ: Sample restricted to races in which the winner had less than 45% of votes (less than the median).
£: Frequency weights: city population as % of the state population




Table 7 - Dependent Variable: Δ(Vote share_A - Vote share_B)§











Winner Runner-up Winner Runner-up
(1) All sample (28) 67.2% 67.8% 60.3% 60.3%
(2)
Large First-Round 
Difference¥ (14) 65.5% 70.8% 59.7% 61.2%
(3)
Clear Second 
Round£ (14) 66.1% 65.7% 62.0% 64.1%
(4)
Tight race for 
secondҰ (14) 64.0% 68.5% 59.1% 61.4%
Table 8 - Campaign Expenditures and Fund-Raising by Round
†: Averages are computed attributing equal weight to cities. Number of observations in parentheses.
Ұ: Only races in which the difference between the runner-up and the third-place is less than the median 
(7.48 percentage points)
Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE)
2008 Mayoral Elections
Mean first-round EXPENSES 
as a share of total expenses†
Mean first-round FUND-RAISING as 
a share of total funds raised†
¥: Only races in which the difference of winner and runner-up vote share is larger than the median (10.83 
percentage points).

















(1) (2)‡ (3) (4)‡ (5) (6)‡ (7) (8)‡ (9) (10)‡
0.293 0.342 0.320 0.177 0.368 0.157 0.357 0.124 0.381 0.174
(0.084)*** (0.041)*** (0.050)***(0.046)*** (0.052)*** (0.041)*** (0.088)*** (0.055)** (0.089)*** (0.061)***
Observations 1705 1476 3912 3610 5876 5403 3840 3299 3485 3161
R
2
0.112 0.032 0.308 0.079 0.361 0.041 0.281 0.066 0.337 0.032
No  focused runner-up£
*** = significant at the 1% level
** = significant at the 5% level
* = significant at the 10% level
Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) and IBOPE.
Δ(Time share_A - 
Time share_B)
Ұ: Only races in which the difference beween the runner-up and the third-placed candidate is larger than 8.6 percentage points 
(75% less contested races)
§ Standard errors are computed with observations clustered at the state-election year level. First round vote shares are normalized to sum 1. Specifications 
include the difference in the first first-round poll, except for columns (3) and (4).
‡ Modified Dependent Variables: Differences from 1st second-round opinion poll; weighted by city population as a % of state 
¥: Runner-ups with more than 34% of the first-round votes (median).
£: Excludes races in which the runner-up party had 2 or less candidates running in runoffs in other states
£: Only races in which the difference in the first first-round poll is less than 11 percentage points (the median)






round time than winner
Strong runner-up-¥
Runner-up >> third 
place Ұ
Winner + Runner-up TV 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.510 0.406 0.453 0.615 0.494
(0.101)*** (0.096)*** (0.108)*** (0.171)*** (0.142)***
0.064 0.190
(0.028)** (0.085)**
0.089 0.289 0.323 0.387 0.196
(0.028)*** (0.032)*** (0.037) (0.075)*** (0.093)**
Number of Observations 7923 7649 7649 8250 6970
R
2
0.209 0.219 0.217 0.337 0.333
Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) and IBOPE
First Poll A - First Pool B
*** = significant at the 1% level
** = significant at the 5% level
* = significant at the 10% level
Constant
† First round vote, TV time and vote intention shares are normalized to sum 1 
§: Same sample as in columns (2).
OLS: First-Round Only†
Runoff Necessary Runoff not Necessary
Table 10 - Dependent Variable: Vote share_A - Vote share_B
§
§ Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to clustering within the state-election year pair. All models include a full 
set of city and year dummies.
Time share A - Time share B
 
 
Median Mean Std Dev Obs
Income per Capita† 4.47 5.42 5.88 7835
Population (in thousands) 9.64 32.5 209.84 7835
Gini †† 0.55 0.55 0.06 7835
Years of Schooling††† 4.46 4.41 1.21 7835
Radio‡ 88.68 85.03 12.21 7854
Television‡ 85.98 81.78 50.11 7854
Source: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE)
Table 11 - Descriptive Statistics, city-election pairs in the 
sample§
§: Observation is a race, i.e., a city-election pair.
†Annual income per capita in thousands of 2000 dollars
†† Gini belongs to the interval [0,1]
††† Years of Schooling is the average number of years of schooling







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0.152 0.519 0.753 1.028 0.204 0.169 1.007













-0.003 -0.011 -0.007 -0.011 -0.005 -0.007 -0.012
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Number of Observations 7835 7835 7835 7835 7835 7835 7835
F - statistic 6.40 12.57 9.34 13.26 12.74 12.79 8.46
R
2 0.133 0.179 0.150 0.191 0.152 0.163 0.209
§ All standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to clustering within the state-election year pair. First round vote shares are
li d t 1
Table 12 - Dependent Variable: Δ(Vote share_A - Vote share_B)§
Constant
Log (Gini )*Δ(Time share A - Time 
share B)
Log (TV)
††† * Δ(Time share A - Time 
share B)
Log (Income)†*Δ(Time share A - 
Time share B)
Log(Schooling)
†† * Δ(Time share A 
- Time share B)
Log (Radio)
†††† * Δ(Time share A - 
Time share B)
Δ(Time share A - Time share B)
Log (populacao)*Δ(Time share A - 
Time share B)
† Income is per capita income in municipality in 2000 dollars. 
* = significant at the 10% level
†† Years of Schooling is the average number of schooling years among the 
††† TV is the percentage of households with at least one television set
Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) and Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE)
†††† Radio is the percentage of households with at least one radio
** = significant at the 5% level





(1) (2) (3) (4)†
-0.022 -0.029 -0.010 -0.010
(0.027) (0.027) (0.033) (0.034)
0.009 0.007 0.005 0.628
(0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (1.658)
0.001 0.069 -0.022 -0.027
(0.073) (0.100) (0.118) (0.121)
1.301 1.534 0.911 0.945









Region Dummies? No No Yes Yes
Year Dummies? No No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 81 81 81 81
p-value of joint significance ‡ 0.603 0.417 0.323 0.517




2 0.037 0.080 0.146 0.112
** = significant at the 5% level
* = significant at the 10% level
Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) and Instituto Brasileiro de Estatística e Geografia (IBGE)
†: Pseudo-R
2 reported.
‡: p-value is computed using the cumulutative probabilty of χ
2(# restrictions tested) variable.
*** = significant at the 1% level
Table 13 - (Not)Explaining the Necessity of a Second Round
Dependent Variable = 1 if the Election is Decided in the First 
Round, 0 otherwise
GDP per capita (in thds of Reais)
Constant
§ White-Huber standard errors, unless otherwise noted.
GDP  per capita Growth (in %)
Electorate Size (in millions)
OLS
Years of Schooling (in years)
Inequality (Gini Index)
Number of Candidates










Mean time share in the 
first round of the 
elections†
Mean vote share 
in the first round 
of the elections†
Mean vote share in the 
second round of the 
elections†
1st round winner 22% 39% 54%
1st round runner-up 23% 30% 46%
1st round winner 23% 41% 55%
1st round runner-up 23% 30% 45%
1st round winner 25% 40% 54%
1st round runner-up 26% 32% 46%
†: Observation is a city. Means computed giving equal weight to cities. Number of races in parentheses.
Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE)









†† (4)£ (5)¥ (6)¥ (7)¥
0.176 0.112 0.126 0.227 0.176 0.176 0.176
(0.044)*** (0.050)** (0.044)*** (0.134)* (0.044)*** (0.034)***(0.017)***
-0.053 -0.104 -0.049 -0.076 -0.053 -0.053 -0.053
(0.013)*** (0.017)*** (0.013)*** (0.039)* (0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.006)***
Number of Observations 107 21 54 56 107 107 107
F-statistic 16.27 3.81 8.07 2.86 15.70 26.09 103.06
R
2
0.132 0.139 0.122 0.067 0.132 0.132 0.132




Δ(Time share_A - Time share_B)
Constant
§ White-Huber standard errors, unless otherwise noted. First round vote shares are normalized to sum 1.
Dependent Variable: Δ(Vote share_A - Vote share_B)§
Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) and IBOPE.
† Sample restricted to elections in which C_pivotal = 0
¥: In columns (5), (6) and (7), standard errors clustered at the state-election year, state and year levels, respectively.
£: Only races in which the runner-up had more TV first-round time than the winner
†† Sample restricted to elections in which the sum of the winner and the runner-up votes were more than 69% of the 
votes in the first round (median of the sum of votes of winner and runner-up).
*** = significant at the 1% level
** = significant at the 5% level
* = significant at the 10% level
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